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Chapter 4
Nostalgic Nationalism, Welfare 
Chauvinism, and Migration Anxieties 
in Central and Eastern Europe
Radu Cinpoeş and Ov Cristian Norocel
4.1  Introduction
Right-wing populist parties across Europe made significant inroads into main 
stream politics in the past couple of decades, to the point that they are actively 
involved in setting the political agenda in several countries (the Brexit vote in the 
UK, and the election of Donald Trump in the US are but two such surprising exam-
ples in this respect). Within this context, increased attention is given to the eco-
nomic dimension. This is not a new aspect in the study of right-wing populism, the 
role played by uneven socio-economic development being highlighted by scholars 
conceptualizing the effects of modernization on the rise of right-wing populism 
(Minkenberg 2000). Nonetheless, what recent research has evidenced is a clearer 
understanding that a new phenomenon labelled “welfare chauvinism” has entered 
the language and practice of right-wing populist parties. Thus, nationalist values are 
promoted to derive a preferential distribution of welfare s provision, which is exclu-
sionary on ethnic and racial grounds (see Derks 2006; Mudde 2007; Norocel 2016). 
In North and Western Europe, this phenomenon manifests through an ethno-centric 
protectionist discursive framework that highlights the need to differentiate between 
the “more deserving” people, which are conceived as belonging to the ethnic major-
ity, and the undeserving “others”, those who exploit the welfare system, the 
“scroungers”, etc.  – particularly immigrants who do not belong to the national 
group. (This is not to say that more nuanced differentiations do not exist within the 
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in-group; an analysis of these distinctions, however, is beyond the scope of this 
study, see Keskinen et al. 2016).
Central and Eastern Europe is to a certain extent different in the way right-wing 
populist discourses approach the issue of welfare chauvinism, inasmuch as it dis-
plays an idiosyncratic pattern. The fall of the Berlin Wall, which symbolically 
marked the Soviet Union losing its grip onto the region, opened the opportunity for 
the accession process into the European Union (EU). This demanded of countries in 
the region to move past their “communist legacy” (and the welfare principles it 
engendered), embrace economic “shock therapy” as an expedient means to adapt to 
market economy, and unquestionably follow neoliberal dogma. These steps were 
presented as part of a symbolic “return to Europe” from a previously exterior posi-
tion to the European construction, thereby confirming and consolidating these coun-
tries’ national identities as European. This notwithstanding, the countries in the 
region are primarily countries of emigration, not in small part due to the aforesaid 
economic upheavals, whose citizens that emigrated westwards have consistently 
been subjected to right-wing populist abuse in relation to welfare (among other 
things) in the countries they immigrated. Instead of seeing the emergence of some 
sense of empathy for those forced to rely on the safety net of welfare provision, a 
similarly welfare chauvinistic discourse as in North and Western Europe has devel-
oped in Central and Eastern Europe, operating largely on the same basis of ethno- 
cultural distinctions between the in-group and out-group. The main difference lies 
in the fact that oftentimes the out-group is formed of ethnic minorities who, due to 
their membership in a particular community (e.g. the Roma), were traditionally 
deemed to have a lesser status in relation to the ethnic majority in the respective 
national context. A recent addition are discriminatory discursive practices targeting 
immigrants (including based on welfare) that started to appear since 2015  in the 
context of the refugee (reception) crisis stemming out of the Syrian conflict (Mavelli 
and Wilson 2016).
It is on this basis, of difference and of alignment of right-wing populist discourse 
in Central and Eastern Europe with phenomena in North and Western Europe that 
our attention is focused on the previously underexplored phenomena of welfare 
chauvinism and emerging politics of migration in Central and Eastern Europe. Put 
simply, this chapter is set to examine the interplay between ideas of national culture, 
as cues for national specificity, and welfare chauvinist proposals, aimed at restrict-
ing welfare provision to a narrowly defined ethnic group, in the context of emerging 
restrictive migration policies in right-wing populist discourses in Central and 
Eastern Europe. For this purpose, we suggest a comparative framework to account 
for the various positions that such parties occupy in national politics in the region. 
Our analysis deals with the case of a right-wing populist party as the main govern-
ing force, such as the Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, hereinafter 
PiS) in Poland; the case of a right-wing populist party as a key opposition force, 
such as the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, 
Jobbik) in Hungary; and thirdly, the case of an unsuccessful right-wing populist 
party, such as the United Romania Party (Partidul România Unită, PRU) in Romania. 
Our qualitative analysis draws on official discourses, reflective of the various 
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political strategies to acquiring power, as articulated by these parties. We chose 
2015 as a starting point for data collection because it marks the beginning of what 
has come to be referred to as the “European refugee crisis” by politicians, media, 
and researchers alike. As such, we aim to map out the various party strategies 
employed, which juxtapose appeals to protecting the cultural specificity of the eth-
nic majorities in each country and welfare chauvinist proposals, and consequently 
shed light onto the culture, welfare, and migration nexus in the Central and Eastern 
European context.
This chapter is structured in five sections. After some methodological clarifica-
tions of our approach to the empirical material, the following section provides a 
theoretical discussion that situates the concept of welfare chauvinism in the context 
of the economic concerns exacerbated by the ongoing global economic crisis, which 
started in 2008. These concerns were incorporated in a particular way by radical- 
right populist parties, drawing on claims about a racially and ethnonationally 
homogenous “people”, pitted against un-deserving “others” (be them ethnic minori-
ties or migrants). The chapter discusses then the three cases in the context of histori-
cally embedded nationalist discourses, which facilitate this incorporation of 
welfare chauvinist appeals. The following section examines the political discourses 
of each of the three parties (PiS, Jobbik, and PRU). It focuses primarily on the por-
trayal of minorities as racially and culturally different groups that fail to share the 
values and work ethics of the “authentic people” represented by the ethnic majori-
ties in each country, and to advance proposals that restrict access to welfare provi-
sion on such basis. In the final part, the study draws together these findings and 
concludes by suggesting that welfare chauvinism provides right-wing populist par-
ties with an additional dimension for exclusion. It also highlights the fact that in 
Central and Eastern Europe, besides the exclusion of migrants on these grounds 
which is an aspect of more recent date (primarily emerged in the context of the 
recent refugee reception crisis), there exists another level of exclusions, unlike in 
North and Western Europe, directed at those who constitute the internal “others”.
4.1.1  Methodological Notes
We argue that the post-communist context provides a solid basis for construct equiv-
alence in this cross-national comparison (on construct equivalence, see van de 
Vijver and Leung 1997; Moors 2004). In fact, it is precisely the difference between 
the parties listed above in terms of their relevance in their respective political sys-
tems that determined their selection. When judged according to the now classic 
differentiation of parties according to their relevance in determining a party system 
(Sartori 2005), we argue, PiS and Jobbik fit into the category of relevant parties. In 
turn, at least for the time being, PRU rather fits within the irrelevant party category.
Keeping with this classification of parties in terms of their size, and more impor-
tantly political strength, PiS can arguably be considered an appropriate illustration 
of a right-wing populist party whose relevance is granted and enforced by its 
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governing or coalition potential (Sartori 2005, pp. 107–108). PiS has consolidated 
its position in Polish politics in the aftermath of 2005 parliamentary elections that 
positioned the party in the first place (26.99% of the votes) and crafted a governing 
coalition with other right of center and conservative political forces that appealed to 
“the anxieties of transition” (Stanley 2016, p. 110). These parties were the agrarian- 
populist and nationalist Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (Samoobrona 
Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, SO) (11.41%) and traditionalist and right-wing nationalist 
League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR) (7.97%). The coalition 
agreement addressed four key areas: reforming the state; designing a firmer foreign 
policy; pursuing a moral and cultural rejuvenation; and enforcing a more socially 
sensitive economic policy (Stanley 2016, p. 119). After a setback in the 2011 elec-
tions, PiS returned to power following the 2015 elections (37.58%), securing a 
majority in the Polish parliament. It secured its position as the largest party in the 
2019 elections (43.59%), but lost control of the chambers.
In turn, Jobbik fits another criterion that positions the party as a relevant political 
force in Hungarian politics, namely its blackmail potential. This refers to the party’s 
potential to change the tactics or direction of party competition within a given polity 
(Sartori 2005, p. 108). Founded in early 2000s, Jobbik contested the first national 
elections in 2006 as part of the MIÉP-Jobbik Third Way Alliance of Parties (MIÉP–
Jobbik a Harmadik Út). The results were disappointing (2.2%), and Jobbik left the 
alliance. The following election cycles witnessed the significant improvement of 
Jobbik’s electoral fortunes. The party became the third political force in the after-
math of 2010 elections (14.47%) and consolidated further its position after the 2014 
elections (20.22%). After these elections, Jobbik became the main opposition force 
in part because of the center left’s political implosion (Ádám and Bozóki 2016, 
pp. 130–135). This position was confirmed in the aftermath of 2018 elections, the 
party becoming the second largest parliamentary party (19.06%). This notwith-
standing, the size itself was not the most important aspect for selecting Jobbik as a 
case of relevance. Rather, it is the party’s ability to influence the ideological posi-
tioning, strategies, and direction of the main governing force, namely the Alliance 
of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége–
Magyar Polgári Szövetség, Fidesz). Indeed, there seems to be a rather ambivalent 
relationship between the two parties, both in terms of how Fidesz is presenting itself 
as the only political actor capable to prevent the right-wing populists to accede to 
power, but also in the manner in which Fidesz attempts to hamper Jobbik’s electoral 
growth by adopting growingly radical and conservative stances. At the same time, 
Jobbik claims to move towards “modern conservatism,” and a more centrist position 
(néppártosodás) (Bustikova and Guasti 2017; Norocel et  al. 2017; Norocel and 
Szabó 2019; Pirro 2015; Pytlas and Kossack 2015).
Finally, the PRU falls into the category of irrelevant parties, having failed to 
secure representation in the Romanian parliament in the 2016 elections and in the 
European Parliament in the 2019 elections. Based on these performances, the party 
is unlikely to enhance its position any time soon. It is, nonetheless, reflective of the 
“phoenix populist” tendencies visible in Romania, whereby right-wing populist par-
ties tend to reemerge periodically in a partially renewed form (Soare and Tufiş 2019).
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The inclusion of the three parties in the analysis aims to offer broad spectrum 
examination of the potential welfare-chauvinist narratives have in exploiting fertile 
right-wing populist grounds in different political contexts, and function as a plat-
form for consolidation in the case of successful political parties (PiS and Jobbik), 
and for entering the political arena in the case of smaller newly-formed par-
ties (PRU).
This contribution draws on data drawn from party programs and manifestos, and 
from public statements made in electoral contexts by prominent members of the 
parties by means of a qualitative approach embedded in Political Discourse Theory 
(PDT) (Glynos and Howarth 2007; Howarth 2000; Howarth et al. 2016). The main 
focus is on the construction of the minorities as ethno-nationally and racially differ-
ent as a basis for justifying the need for restrictive welfare policies targeting these 
groups. The analysis identifies the similar patterns of exclusion that characterize the 
strategies and discourses employed by the three parties in order to articulate suc-
cessfully the nationalist and welfare nexus.
4.2  Conceptual Discussion: Nationalism 
and Welfare Chauvinism
This chapter is concerned with the modern articulation of right-wing populist ideol-
ogy, which employs nationalism as the central tenet for group membership, high-
lighting the congruence between demos and nation. The latter is presented as 
ethnically and culturally homogenous, and the idea of belonging is expressed 
through “radicalizing criteria of inclusion and exclusion”, which pit the in-group 
against the out-group (Minkenberg 2017, p. 14). Concerning the basis for national-
ist mobilization, we draw upon modernization theory, which highlights in its 
explanatory framework for social change the role of transition from agrarian to 
industrial societies, from dynastic to popular rule, and the growing importance of 
individual autonomy and of rational thought. These prompted significant transfor-
mations with regards to social organization and made it possible for people to 
“imagine” themselves as part of larger, national communities (Anderson 1991; 
Gellner 1983). In this context, right-wing populist ideology is associated with “the 
right turn”. Already an intrinsic part of nationalist ideology (derived from its inher-
ently exclusionary articulation of the nation), the “radicalized notion of national 
homogeneity” informs the right-wing populist drive towards a nostalgic and roman-
ticized notion of regained national grandeur, traditional family values, intertwined 
with propensity to rigidly hierarchical and authoritarian charismatic male leader-
ship (Minkenberg 2017, pp. 13–16; Norocel 2013, pp. 164–178).
While these elements are useful in explaining the emergence of right-wing popu-
list ideology within the context of contemporary rejuvenation of nationalist fervor, 
to understand its mobilizing power it is necessary to add another aspect: that of 
economic cleavages generated by late modernity. Rapid and uneven social 
4 Nostalgic Nationalism, Welfare Chauvinism, and Migration Anxieties in Central…
56
transformations, accompanied by the cyclicity of crises, all constitutive elements of 
unleashed globalization, lead to large groups being left out as social and economic 
losers out of these processes. It is these people that are likely to be mobilized by the 
radicalizing criteria of inclusion and exclusion highlighted above (Loch and Norocel 
2015; Minkenberg 2000, 2015).
The growing importance of these economic elements in the right-wing populist 
ideology has increasingly attracted scholarly attention more recently. Earlier 
research on public opinion toward immigration reform in the US (Citrin et al. 1997), 
for instance, had already evidenced high level of support for policies that condi-
tioned welfare provision for immigrants upon criteria to do with length of residency 
in the country. In the European context, then, research pointed out the nexus between 
the integration of European Union (EU) social security system, and national welfare 
policies (Martinsen 2005). The prohibition on discriminating against EU member 
states citizens in national welfare policy has become a bone of contention for those 
political forces conceiving of welfare provision as the proprietary right of the nation, 
whereby ethno-cultural and racializing criteria determine in-group membership. 
This enabled framing increasingly aggressive anti-immigration stances in economic 
terms, militating for preferential if not exclusive access to welfare provision for the 
in-group, which is conceptually labelled welfare chauvinism.
Welfare chauvinism, as a specific tenet of right-wing populist ideology in Europe 
(though it has permeated the vocabulary of mainstream parties as well), has gained 
saliency in the context of 2008 global financial crisis, and became exacerbated by 
the 2015 “refugee (reception) crisis” (Keskinen 2016; Loch and Norocel 2015; 
Norocel 2016). This notwithstanding, the use of welfare chauvinist appeals by 
right-wing populist parties has so far been mainly researched in North and Western 
European countries. This is partly understandable for two reasons. First, these coun-
tries have higher immigration levels, and the exclusionary rhetoric focusing on wel-
fare matters becomes politically expedient, as racialized out-groups are easier to 
scapegoat. Second, as it is the case particularly in Northern Europe, the welfare 
system is an important marker of national identity, which makes it a preferred target 
of right-wing populist parties (Hellström 2016; Keskinen 2016; Norocel 2016; see 
also Hellström and Tawat Chap. 2, and Pettersson Chap. 3, in this volume).
4.3  Markers of National Identity and Belonging in Poland, 
Hungary and Romania
This section provides an overview of the central themes in the wider nationalist 
discourses, which facilitate right-wing populist mobilization. What characterizes all 
three cases, we argue, is the master frame of nostalgia underpinned by fantasmatic 
restorative nationalism, which demands a return to an alleged state of moral purity 
of nationhood that can only be attained by means of safeguarding the ethnic and 
cultural purity of the nation.
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In Poland, the basis of nationalist discourse is formed by a nostalgic reinterpreta-
tion of Polish identity, which adds a mythological layer to historical events. This is 
not necessarily expressed through overt references to a homeland with clearly defin-
able boundaries. Instead, the homeland is invested a symbolic value, which enabled 
the Polish nation to survive through periods of statelessness during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, and later the WWII devastations. The emphasis is thus put 
on the link between Polish ethnic identity and Catholicism, distilled in the figure of 
“Pole-Catholic” (Polak-katolik), for long perceived as a means to overcome “the 
absence of ‘national’ territorial boundaries and political sovereignty” (Zubrzycki 
2014, p. 204).
The Pole-Catholic served to confirm the ethnic superiority of Poles in interwar 
Poland, particularly in relation to the Jewish population, and to justify state- 
sanctioned anti-Semitism. In the aftermath of WWII, which witnessed genocide and 
ethnic cleansing, the borders of Poland shifted once more, though the country was 
then characterized by a much greater ethnic homogeneity than before. In the new 
context, the Pole-Catholic came to epitomize the authenticity and legitimacy of eth-
nic Poles as opposed to the illegitimate Soviet-groomed elites. The role played by 
the Catholic Church in opposing the Soviet-backed regime entrenched its position 
as a key component of the ethno-cultural landscape that defines Polish national 
identity (Stanley 2016, p. 112).
In the post-1989 context, the initially jubilant rediscovery of the European aspect 
of Polish identity, and the pursuit of EU membership have been gradually replaced 
in recent years by a critical and outright reactionary stance towards “Brussels”, a 
shorthand for the complex EU institutional architecture. The Pole-Catholic came to 
play a key role in the right-wing populist discourse of PiS, opposing a highly moral 
and ethnically pure popular majority to a Western-oriented liberal elite that enforced 
Brussels “corrosive influence” onto the Polish nation.
In Hungary, nostalgic nationalism pertains to both territorial contours, and mem-
bership in the Hungarian nation. With regards to the former, the territorial loses 
Hungary sustained following the Treaty of Trianon (1920) remain a recurring theme 
in everyday manifestations of nationalism (Korkut 2012). The contours of “Greater 
Hungary”, marking the borders of the Kingdom of Hungary within the Austrian- 
Hungary Monarchy before WWI, are now a rather ubiquitous occurrence on car 
stickers, something that just a few years ago would have been frowned upon (Molnár 
2016, p. 174). The Hungarian irredentism linked to the territorial losses in the after-
math of WWI is also reading and reinterpreting historical episodes in a mythologi-
cal key. This aims to provide a sense of historical continuity and greatness despite 
Hungarian defeat. This is reinforced though such symbols as the mythological bird 
of prey omnipresent on coats of arms and monuments (turul), and the red and white 
stripes of the House of Árpád, the first dynastic rulers of the Kingdom of Hungary.
Closely linked to the territorial issue, the second aspect of the restorative dimen-
sion of Hungarian nationalism concerns the notion of kin-state responsibility 
towards the recognition and protection of the cultural identity of Hungarian minori-
ties that in the post-Trianon context found themselves outside Hungarian borders. 
Indeed, significant Hungarian minorities are present in the neighboring countries, 
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particularly in Romania, Slovakia, Croatia, and Serbia (Ádám and Bozóki 2016; 
Korkut 2012; Loch and Norocel 2015; Udrea 2014).
The nostalgic revisionist-revivalist issue, which incorporates both the physical 
territorial aspect, and membership into the ethno-cultural nation irrespective of the 
borders, is accompanied by a religious grounding for belonging in the traditional 
Christian Churches, namely the Catholic Church and the Hungarian Calvinist 
Church. This combination brings about another central marker of the articulation of 
Hungarian national identity: fantasmatic anti-modernism. This manifests specifi-
cally in anti-EU feelings and more broadly in the belief that Hungary needs to turn 
its back on Europe’s decadence, and instead recover its former glory, a view which 
is shared by both Fidesz and Jobbik (Ádám and Bozóki 2016; Krekó and Mayer 
2015; see also Kondor and Littler Chap. 8, in this volume).
Finally, in Romania, nostalgic nationalism appears to be highly resilient, although 
the right-wing populist forces have been on retreat the past decade (Cinpoeş 2010, 
2015; Norocel 2013; Norocel et al. 2017; Szabó et al. 2019). The history is read in 
a mythological key with regard to Romanian language, origins and ancestry, conti-
nuity over the territory, and Christian Orthodox tradition. These, in turn, articulate 
the sense of cultural specificity along which the Romanian ethnic majority is struc-
tured and position against “other” ethic communities (particularly the Roma, the 
Jews, and the Hungarian minority). The strength of the nationalist discourse is 
enhanced by its successful use, rehearsal, and transmission over time by very differ-
ent political actors: from early nationalists of the nineteenth century, interwar fas-
cists, Ceauşescu dictatorial regime, through the post-1989 context (Cinpoeş 
2010, 2015).
Much like in the case of Hungary, the ethnic and cultural continuity, which draws 
its strength from religious tradition, and the promise of territorial aggrandizement 
constitute key elements in the Romanian nationalist discourse. Unlike Hungary, 
however, Romania emerged as a net beneficiary from the WWI, with its territory 
nearly doubled in size compared to the start of the war. The short-lived existence of 
Greater Romania, incorporating besides the Old Kingdom the historical regions 
inhabited by Romanians (Transylvania, Bessarabia, and Bukovina) remains the 
zenith of Romanian nationalism (Cinpoeş 2010). The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, 
and the subsequent annexation of several territories by Soviet Union represent the 
equivalent of the Treaty of Trianon for the Romanian nationalist discourse, and its 
key argument for modern irredentist claims towards the Republic of Moldova. 
Similar to Hungary, Romania has a kin-state approach towards ethnic Romanians in 
the neighboring states.
Within the post-1989 context, EU membership was presented as the country’s 
“rightful return to Europe”. It built on a selective reading of the nationalist project, 
which emphasized Romanian representing “an island of Latinity in the East”, and 
Romanians being “steadfast defenders of the European borders”. This notwith-
standing, in the aftermath of 2007 EU accession, and particularly with the onset of 
2008 financial crisis, Euroscepticism was fueled by growing unease regarding what 
was perceived as subordination to, and economic dependency on “Brussels”, and 
other international institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund). Like in 
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Poland and Hungary, in Romania too the appeals to rediscover national pride, 
underpinned by history, tradition, and Christianity, and restore “traditional Romanian 
moral values” (focused on the traditional heterosexual family) constitute the core 
elements of anti-EU mobilization.
4.4  Right-Wing Populist Parties, National Identity, Welfare 
Chauvinism, and Migration Anxieties
This section examines the discourses of selected right-wing populist parties to flesh 
out in what manner they exploit the interplay between ethno-cultural articulations 
of the national community, and appeals for preferential, if not exclusive access to 
welfare provision based on national belonging. There are two main issues at stake 
here. First, while welfare chauvinism is not a new phenomenon, it is less clear 
whether there is some degree of alignment of Central and Eastern European right- 
wing populist discourses, and those in North and Western Europe, given the diverg-
ing migration contexts of these regions. Second, looking closer at the level of 
consistency between the three cases, this reflects the varying party strategies for 
including welfare chauvinism in their discourses for acquiring power.
Among the most successful right-wing populist parties in the region, PiS polled 
37.58% of the votes the 2015 Polish parliamentary elections, becoming the govern-
ing party. A significant part of PiS electoral success appears to be due to its social 
and economic program, which envisioned several welfare policies that appealed 
both to its working-class support base and more widely. It included among others, a 
VAT rate cut, a pro-natalist tax rebate based on the number of children in the family, 
and a general opposition to cuts on public spending.
Internally-focused welfare chauvinism is not articulated, since the country’s eth-
nic homogeneity, with nearly 95% ethnic Poles and no other ethnic group exceeding 
1% of the population, makes scapegoating an internal group on ethnic grounds 
rather difficult. As a result, the right-wing populist exclusionary discourse is directed 
against an exterior “other”, which is somewhat paradoxical given that Poland took 
in thousands of Chechen refuges of Islamic faith in the past two decades (Bustikova 
and Guasti 2017, p. 171). In the context of the 2015 refugee crisis, PiS positioned 
itself in the starkest opposition to the EU resettlement quota proposal, both in the 
run-up to the 2016 elections and subsequently. Used as an electoral asset in its cam-
paign, PiS channelized the anger at the outgoing liberal government, which had 
agreed to the refugee quotas, increasing its support among center-right voters who 
feared the social and economic costs of taking in refugees (Bustikova and Guasti 
2017, p. 172; see also Stanley 2016, p. 123).
A quasi-apocalyptic fantasmatic logic  (Glynos and Howarth 2007; Howarth 
et al. 2016) was employed by high ranked PiS politicians in addressing the refugee 
matter. Displaying overtly racist tones it positioned people fleeing violence and con-
flict in a position of fundamental difference to the Polish, and Europeans more 
4 Nostalgic Nationalism, Welfare Chauvinism, and Migration Anxieties in Central…
60
broadly. PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński, for example, warned against the health 
threat that refugees represent, carrying “very dangerous diseases long absent from 
Europe” besides “all sorts of parasites and protozoa, which […] while not danger-
ous in the organisms of these people, could be dangerous here” (Cienski 2015). 
Consequently, upon winning elections, PiS reneged on the previous government’s 
promise to take in refugees. The justifications officially provided conflated, as in 
Hungary, security concerns with emerging expressions of welfare chauvinism.
Articulating the new political line, then-Prime Minister Beata Szydło stated in an 
unequivocal manner that the Polish government’s main responsibility is “to ensure 
the security of our fellow citizens” from the apparent threat posited by “thousands 
of migrants who come here only to improve their living conditions”, and amongst 
whom allegedly “there are also terrorists” (DW 2016). Referring to people seeking 
refuge as “migrants” signals a suspicious skepticism towards their “true” intentions: 
either freeloading onto or bringing terror to their unware hosts. In this context, we 
argue, PiS makes use of welfare chauvinism to consolidate Pole-Catholic nationalist 
discourse and add new layers to the metaphorical depiction of Poland as “Christ of 
Nations” (Polska Chrystusem Narodów), which emphasizes “Poland’s suffering at 
the hands of other countries and its redemptive rebirth.” (Stanley 2016, p. 119).
Jobbik, in turn, polled 19.06% of the votes in the 2018 Hungarian parliamentary 
elections and secured its position as the largest opposition party. Besides its outspo-
ken anti-Semitism, Jobbik has a well-documented anti-Roma rhetoric (Ádám and 
Bozóki 2016; Korkut 2012; Loch and Norocel 2015; Montgomery 2015). Jobbik’s 
policy section concerning the status of ethnic minorities in Hungary deals almost 
exclusively with the Roma, solely referred to by their derogative appellation Gypsies 
(cigány). Moreover, the “jobs instead of benefits” welfare policy is expressly tied to 
the Roma. Despite the positive framing, which argues that “the real interest of the 
Gypsy community lies in a rapid social integration rather than affirmative action, 
the benefits of which the Gypsy community cannot really utilize in its current situ-
ation”, the policy is clear in its discriminatory interpretation to access to welfare 
provision, specifically targeting Roma and identifying them as criminals leading 
lives “incompatible with the law” (Jobbik n.d.). This attitude is echoed in the party’s 
electoral program, which allocated a whole section to the issue of “Hungarian- 
Gypsy coexistence” (Jobbik 2014, pp. 30–31). Even more so, the same electoral 
program reveals an anxious fantasmatic logic (Glynos and Howarth 2007; Howarth 
et al. 2016) pertaining to the failing birth rate of ethnic Hungarians, juxtaposed to 
the “explosive increase of Gypsy population”, which is intensely discussed in the 
section addressing Jobbik’s demographic policy (Jobbik 2014, p. 28).
If Jobbik had previously employed pro-Islam rhetoric to make its anti-Semitism 
more palatable, with the onset of the refugee (reception) crisis in 2015 the party 
turned on its heels. While Islam as a state religion was praised in the Middle Eastern 
context as a counterforce to Israel, it became problematic as the religious affiliation 
of people seeking to cross the Hungarian borders (Thorleifsson 2017, p.  324). 
Consequently, Islamophobia gained a prominent role in Jobbik’s discourse, often 
justified by the alleged security threat the refugees pose, either in terms of terrorist 
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activity, criminal behavior, or harassment of the Hungarian population. As the refu-
gee crisis unfolded, Jobbik articulated a distinctive welfare chauvinist perspective, 
exploiting social anxieties in deprived working-class towns and poor rural areas. It 
argued about the potentially negative impact that the costs of integrating the refu-
gees could have onto access to welfare provision by disadvantaged ethnic 
Hungarians, reminding that “also Hungarians are poor”. In this regard, Jobbik rep-
licated Fidezs’ anti-immigration discourse by juxtaposing cultural nationalist and 
economic arguments “thus catering to multiple audiences, from those fearing labor 
competition to those fearing cultural contamination” (Thorleifsson 2017, p. 326).
By far the weakest in terms of electoral performance, in the 2016 Romanian 
parliamentary elections PRU polled 2.79% for the Lower Chamber, and 2.95% for 
the Senate. These results were well under the electoral threshold. In turn, the estab-
lished right-wing populist party emphatically named Greater Romania Party 
(Partidul România Mare, PRM) had just lost its long-serving leader in 2015. 
Without him, PRM polled even less than PRU (1.04%, respectively 1.18%), so 
entering a right-wing populist alliance under PRU leadership seems a final attempt 
at maintaining political relevance. Ideologically, PRU defines itself as a nationalist 
party, whose aim is to “regain Romania for Romanians”.
Its egalitarian economic policy is somewhat reminiscent of that of PRM, particu-
larly regarding its selective egalitarianism (Norocel 2013). The envisaged welfare 
reform seems to be based on an exclusionary approach to the national community. 
Indeed, despite this apparent concern with inequality and poverty, the PRU leader 
Cristian Diaconu expressed derogative views about people receiving unemployment 
benefits. His stance echoes strongly with the wider negative connotations that large 
segments of the right-leaning younger, urban population associate to welfare provi-
sion. Particularly the term referring to a recipient welfare provision as a (socially) 
assisted (person) (asistat) is used as a slur, with the implicit suggestion that such 
people are lazy, unwilling to work, and generally a burden onto the hardworking 
taxpayers.
In Diaconu’s use of “the assisted (people)”, it pertains the Roma, solely referred 
to as Gypsies (ţigani). Employing the fantasmatic logic in a negative key (Glynos 
and Howarth 2007; Howarth et al. 2016), Diaconu argued their fundamental differ-
ence from the ethnic majority: “Perhaps Romanians have had enough of these 
assisted [people], whose only illness is not wanting to work, of these minorities who 
want to rule the country, to have a state within a state”. Making reference to a period 
of oppression that ethnic Romanians experienced under the Austro-Hungarian dual 
monarchy as a lower status populace, Diaconu then added “now we are heading to 
a similar situation, but this time we have the Gypsies [to oppress us]” (Tudor 2015).
In preparation for the 2016 elections, PRU launched a 10-point electoral mani-
festo that began by promising to increase the minimum wage, and among others, 
included protectionist economic promises (such as subsidies restricted to “Romanian 
companies”, and defense of “Romanian capital” against excessive state control) 
(Tudor 2016). This reflected the wider cleavage in Romanian politics. This pitted 
the center-left, which promised fiscal and welfare reforms aimed at alleviating pov-
erty and reducing inequality, against the conservative center-right and neoliberal 
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newcomers, which maintained the line of fiscal restraint and stimulation of capital 
that was agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the aftermath of 
2008 economic crisis. As such, while formally proclaiming a preoccupation for wel-
fare issues, PRU positioned itself against those socially most vulnerable, adding a 
racializing aspect to their depiction, and embraced welfare chauvinism.
In a similar manner, although Romania was not on the European migratory route, 
PRU denounced the EU solidarity agreement arguing against “colonizing Romania 
with refugees” (Tudor 2016). The fantasmatic logic of Romania being “colonized” 
by refugees was taken to an extreme by Diaconu who argued that “being an EU 
Member State […] does not entail an obligation for us to become either an Asian 
state, or an African state, and most definitely not a Muslim state.” (BZI 2015) 
Welfare chauvinist arguments were added to this, as “Romania cannot afford waves 
of immigrants from Africa and Asia”, and warned that “no one has the right to push 
these dangerous immigrants down our throats, because we lack both the resources 
and capacity to integrate them, particularly as they are themselves against it” 
(BZI 2015).
4.5  Conclusions
This chapter explored the interplay between claims of national culture and ethnic 
specificity, and welfare chauvinist appeals in the right-wing populist discourses in 
Central and Eastern Europe. It analyzed three right-wing populist parties, consider-
ing their relevance in their respective party system (PiS, Jobbik, and PRU). The 
similarities in the discursive articulations of national identity and belonging in the 
three countries, which appeal to such aspects as history, tradition, territorial conti-
nuity, and religion, and are positioned against such globalizing forces as the EU (a 
trend that, by and large, characterize the entire region) (Ádám and Bozóki 2016; 
Bustikova and Guasti 2017; Stanley 2016) were matched to a large extent by simi-
larities in the way welfare chauvinism is integrated in the rhetoric of right-wing 
populist parties.
Despite being countries of emigration, which have not experienced directly a 
substantial immigrant presence (with the recent exception of the sudden surge of the 
migrant population in Hungary), all three cases display incipient patterns of welfare 
chauvinism directed at external “others” understood in an apocalyptic fantasmatic 
logic: the immigrant communities are depicted as “soon to be flooding,” “deceitful 
parasites” that pose a threat to, and require the protection of the national/religious 
specificity of the “people”. In this sense, the cases show an alignment with patterns 
of exclusion that characterize North and Western Europe (Keskinen 2016; Hellström 
2016; Norocel 2016). These similarities notwithstanding, the case of Jobbik and 
PRU also reveals what can potentially constitute a Central and Eastern European 
specificity. While welfare chauvinism targeting external “others” appears to be a 
recent phenomenon, the one directed at the “other within”, at the ethnic minorities 
(predominantly the Roma), constitutes a historical aspect that has much salience in 
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the rhetoric of right-wing populist parties. Welfare chauvinism adds a new dimen-
sion to the thinly-veiled xenophobia, and widespread demographic anxieties con-
cerning the relationship between national ethnic majorities and historical ethnic 
minorities in these countries. On this matter, PiS can be considered an exception to 
this regional pattern, largely due to Poland’s much more homogenous population, 
which precludes the clear identification of an internal scapegoat.
Finally, despite the different degrees of electoral success the three parties in 
terms display two interrelated points emerge. In terms of the snapshot picture, it 
may appear that the culture-welfare nexus provides a stronger mobilizing ground 
for right-wing populism in Poland and Hungary than in Romania. In terms of the 
broader picture, however, the fact that a newly established party such as the PRU 
was able to immediately latch onto this type of discourse shows its potential to be 
employed more successfully by newly emerging populist parties, or by established 
parties positioned closer to the mainstream. Together, these dimensions show the 
potential strength these issues have to be exploited effectively in the region (despite 
the current uneven electoral success).
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